According to Michael Walzer, the role morality that governs political actors requires that they be prepared to risk getting 'dirty hands': they should take an action where that is necessary to the achievement of the political goals to which they are committed, even when doing so is nevertheless morally wrong. Walzer implies that the demands of this role morality apply with equal force to all political agents. In this paper I argue against that implication, particularly in relation to political officials -so-called 'professional politicians'.
Introduction
In The prince Machiavelli famously claimed that a ruler 'must learn how not to be virtuous', adding that he should 'make use of this or not according to need'. 1 It seems natural to understand Machiavelli here as using 'virtue' in the sense of 'conventional virtue': clearly Machiavelli considers that in certain situations some forms of behaviour that are, in general, praiseworthy, merit condemnation in a prince, and conversely, action that ordinarily is vicious may count as virtuous for the prince. There is a morality that is appropriate to princes that can and, on occasion, does come into conflict with ordinary morality. When such a clash occurs, the good prince is precisely the one who acts according to the dictates of princely, rather than conventional, morality.
Michael Walzer interprets Machiavelli's advice as equivalent to the demand that political actors be prepared to have 'dirty hands'. According to Walzer, 'a particular act of government (in a political party or a state) may be exactly the right thing to do in utilitarian terms and yet leave the man who does it guilty of a moral wrong'. 2 Despite the fact that this action will render him guilty of a moral wrong, the political actor should nevertheless do it -he should get his hands dirty.
Roughly, someone faces a dirty hands situation (DHS) when they have to do evil in order to do good. More precisely, someone faces a DHS when the following four conditions hold:
1. They have the opportunity to achieve some morally good end, and they aim to do so. 2. There are means available to them to achieve this end that are normally morally wrong (they are 'dirty'). 3. The use of these means is the best, or perhaps the only practicable, way of ensuring that this good end is realised. 4. The good likely to be achieved by using the dirty means substantially outweighs the evil likely to follow from their use.
The first two of these conditions often hold: we commonly find ourselves in situations where we could achieve good ends by using dirty means. Furthermore, sometimes such means are the only or best way to achieve these ends, satisfying the third condition. Normally, however, the fact that someone would have had to use dirty means to produce a good outcome discharges them from any obligation to do so; conversely, that a good outcome was aimed at or even achieved does not provide sufficient justification for the use of dirty means. That is, there is at least a strong presumption that good ends do not justify the use of dirty means. This presumption becomes moot, however, when the fourth condition holds. If someone can save the lives of a number of innocent hostages by making false promises to the hostage takers, for example, there seem to be powerful reasons in favour of them making such promises. A person who supports their refusal to do so by appeal to the presumption that the end does not justify the means leaves themselves open to a suspicion of 'rule worship', or of being obsessed with maintaining their own moral purity regardless of the cost to others.
Dirty hands situations, thus, appear to support the apparently paradoxical claim that there are some morally bad actions that we (morally) ought nevertheless to do. There are at least three kinds of responses to that claim. The first is simply to deny it: we ought not to engage in these kinds of actions, whatever the consequences. The second is to dissolve the appearance of paradox. These kinds of actions are, as claimed in the second condition above, normally morally wrong. When we face a DHS, however, they are no longer morally wrong, but rather morally permissible, or even obligatory. This reasoning will appeal to a consequentialist, who sees moral rules as simply rules of thumb, deriving whatever normative force they have from their usefulness in helping limited beings like us to act in ways that will produce good consequences. The third response -Walzer's -is to embrace the paradox. We ought to act in the normally morally wrong way, and that action remains wrong.
While, as Walzer himself points out, DHS can arise in ordinary life, they are likely to arise for holders of certain kinds of roles, in virtue of their occupation of those roles. Recall the first of the conditions for the person facing a DHS: they have the opportunity to achieve some morally good end, and they aim to do so. Roles are typically individuated teleologically, in terms of the ends they are supposed to achieve. Morally justified roles are those that help us to achieve morally good ends (as the role of parent, for example, helps us to achieve the morally good end of caring for the young). Role morality, then, is a specification of the ways in which role holders should act to achieve those ends. Thus, role morality is already grounded in consequentialist (what Walzer calls utilitarian) reasoning, and it is given that the holder of a morally justified role aims to achieve a morally good end. Furthermore, in virtue of their specific expertise, powers and so on, often role holders will have opportunities to achieve that end that others do not.
Walzer clearly feels that the problem of dirty hands is particularly pressing for who occupy a political role. In part this is because the politician is in a position where the decisions they make can have enormously important consequences. But it also stems from the particular kind of moral environment that the political actor is likely to find themselves in. While the political role is, or can be, morally justified, since it can be used to bring about morally good outcomes, the political realm itself, as described by Walzer (taking himself to be following Machiavelli), is a cesspool of immorality, a 'terrible competition for power and glory'. 3 It seems that for Walzer the demand that the political actor be prepared to get their hands dirty is required by good faith. One of the obligations that one assumes in taking on a role in good faith is to be prepared to act effectively to realise the ends of the role. In politics effectiveness depends not only on how one acts oneself, but how others act, and often those others will be acting in ways that makes it necessary to act immorally to bring about the valued end.
Though the demand that political actors should be prepared to get their hands dirty seems on the face of it to be shocking, in licensing or even requiring immorality in good people, Walzer's account of political role morality is actually highly moralised. The political actor must make choices at every point according to whether they will bring him closer to the (moral) end for which he committed to himself to political action in the first place. He cannot rest content, as many role holders can, in the knowledge that even if this role-mandated action is not helping to make the world a better place, or even if all his actions are not doing so, nevertheless overall the world is a better place for such action. This demand to judge each of their actions in the light of their animating moral end applies with equal force to every kind of political actor: to Cesare Borgia, Harry Truman, a candidate for municipal office, and nineteenth-century Russian terrorists. 4 Australian
In this paper I argue that there are in fact important differences between different kinds of political actors and the moral standards that apply to them; differences that are already at least implicit in Machiavelli's writings in the sixteenth century. In particular I focus on the role morality that applies to those who hold political office in modern states, so-called 'professional politicians'.
What is professional ethics?
The division of material labour in modern societies has led to the creation of a variety of distinct occupational roles, distinguished both by the specific ends they aim to achieve, and the means used to achieve them. At its broadest, 'professional ethics' is a term that is used as a synonym for 'occupational ethics', the moral requirements that apply to people in virtue of their occupational role. Since such roles involve those who hold them receiving payment for services on which others depend, many of these requirements simply follow from general moral requirements: fairness demands that we work diligently and carefully, honesty that we render accurate account of work done, and so on. Given the teleological definition of occupational roles, however, some of these requirements are more particular to the various occupations. A good chef, for example, is not simply one who does an honest day's work, but one who is able efficiently to produce food that the public finds appetising. Occupational role morality, then, requires that occupational role holders develop and exercise the skills required to do their work properly, skills that count as occupational virtues. It also requires that they develop an awareness of, and capacity to resist, the temptations to corrupt practice that inhere in particular roles (to bribery in police work; to using company resources for personal enrichment in the case of business executives, etc).
More narrowly, 'professional ethics' refers to a subset of 'occupational ethics', that which applies to people in virtue of their membership of what might be called the paradigmatic professions, such as medicine and law. 5 There is a good deal of consensus in the sociological and philosophical literature as to the distinguishing marks of professional occupations. 6 Firstly, the work of its members is oriented to the provision of an important good. These goods -the defining ends of each profession -are, or involve, the satisfaction of fundamental needs. 7 (Someone has a fundamental need when they will suffer significant harm if they fail to obtain the object of that need.) The medical profession aims to satisfy the need for maintenance and restoration of health, the legal profession the need for justice, and so on. These needs are the grounds for a right to their satisfaction among members of the public, and correspondingly for the duty of professionals to satisfy them. The goods that the professional aims to provide then are public goods, at least in the sense of being goods that ought to be accessible to any member of the public who needs them (and in some cases in the more technical sense of public goods where such a good can only be available to any member of the public if it is available to all). The individual professional can do their duty in part by attending to the needs of their own clients, but may also be required to act in concert with other members of the profession to provide the conditions where the needs of the community as a whole can be met.
Of course, many occupational groups, from farmers to transport workers, satisfy needs. Professions are further distinguished from other needs-satisfying groups by the degree and kind of creative expertise that their members must be able to deploy. Aristotle's distinction between what he calls the practical arts -which he identifies as politics, household management and ethics -and the productive arts -which include such things as shipbuilding and garment making -can help illuminate the nature of this expertise. 8 Both sorts of arts are directed towards bringing about valuable changes in the world, and both derive value from their conduciveness to the realisation of such states of affairs. They differ, however, in that the goods that can be achieved through the exercise of productive arts are purely external to those arts -that is, they can be specified without reference to those arts, and it is at least conceivable that those goods might be gained independently of their exercise -so they are valuable only as a means to the end of, ultimately, the good life. Practical arts, on the other hand, are not valuable only as means to ends, since their exercise involves activity that is valuable in itself, and that is internal to that activity.
Mastery of both sorts of arts may require the development of highly refined skills. However, the skills of the productive artist are essentially mechanical, in the sense that they can be exhaustively specified, and when applied to similar circumstances will produce similar outcomes. We could and, of course, increasingly do, program a machine to carry out such tasks. The skills of the practical artist, on the other hand, are not mechanical.
They are rather open-ended, both in their specification and in their application. There is, for example, often no mechanical procedure to determine the most appropriate means to achieving the desired end -even that end itself may not be fully fixed. It is characteristic of these kinds of arts that practitioners must exercise discretion and begin to develop idiosyncratic styles of practice in doing so.
The mastery and exercise of practical arts is, then, (partly) constitutive of the good life. Hence, the skills that are required for the successful prosecution of the productive arts are more than technical virtues -they can be seen as moral virtues. The line between practical and productive arts may not be sharp, some arts may well straddle it, and there is room for disagreement about particular cases, but clearly much professional activity exemplifies the features of the practical arts, and people are attracted to it for this reason.
The third salient distinguishing feature of professions is that members of professions are granted a high degree of autonomy in the exercise of their expertise. The need for this autonomy follows from the nature of the expertise professionals possess, outlined in the previous paragraphs. Since there is often no mechanical procedure for determining appropriate action, the professional must be free to decide how to act.
Finally, professions are distinguished from other occupational groups by the ways in which they are collectively organised. Professionals must come together in what might be called a professional college. The characteristic skilled creativity and consequently necessary autonomy of the professional can only be developed within a group, and much professional work is collegial in nature, with individual practitioners drawing on the special skills and knowledge of colleagues. The paradigmatic professions, as well as being colleges in this sense, are also organised as corporate bodies. Any profession comprises persons who are not simply practitioners, but who also occupy specific positions and stand in authority relations to each other in structured professional
organisations and pursue the collective ends of the professional through such activities as lobbying the government, accrediting individuals and institutions, disciplining or debarring miscreant members, and ensuring that sufficient practitioners are trained and licensed, and that remuneration for such practitioners is sufficiently attractive to make it likely that they will actually exercise their skills, and so on.
Professionals are not simply people who have the ability and willingness to exercise a practical skill to satisfy fundamental needs. They are also people who are entitled to do so. That is, professionals are not identified simply by the role they play, but also by the office they occupy. Someone occupies a role, in the sense in which it will be used here, when they actively pursue one of the practical arts. They hold an office, when the (full) exercise of that role is limited to those who have been granted the right to do so by an entity that that has the higher order right to grant that right (in Hohfeldian terms a power), and where, typically, the right is conditional on the putative office holder conforming to certain explicit norms in their exercise of their role. Being a warrior is a role: a warrior is a person who is disposed to exercise their skill in the use of violence. Being a soldier, on the other hand, is an office: a soldier is a warrior who has been recruited into their national army, obeys the commands of their superior officer and so on. Similarly, being a healer is a role, while being a doctor is an office.
Two questions suggest themselves in respect of this power to determine the allocation of offices. Why is it needed? And, given that it is needed, to whom should it be granted? There are a number of reasons why roles should become offices. Firstly, given the vulnerability of members of the public to the abuse of the role, allowing only those who are granted office to exercise their art, and issuing credible threats that this right will be cancelled if misused, gives office holders incentives to act as they should. In some cases, such abuse is driven not by attempts to realise personal goals such as monetary gain, without diligent exercise of skill, but rather by the very desire to exercise that skill. So, the office of soldier is arguably necessary, but we want soldiers to restrain the exercise of their war-making skills. Secondly, there may be problems in recognising who actually does possess the skills distinctive of the role. Medical quackery, for instance, can cause great harm. One of the functions of requiring healers to possess institutional status is to certify to those who need their services that they do in fact possess the skills they claim, and that they have an incentive to use those skills properly, for fear of losing their licence to do so. Thirdly, there may be good reason to limit the number of certain kinds of offices, for example to ensure that there are enough but not too many practitioners, for fear that competition among them will cause them to cut fees to the point where satisfactory service cannot be provided.
The potential for corruption in a system where access to a good is controlled by those who themselves stand to benefit from restriction of access is obvious. A good deal of the sociological literature on the professions has taken it that control of this access, and the benefits that come with it, is the animating aim of professionalising groups. In effect, the professions have been seen as 'rent seekers', where the rent in question is not only unearned economic advantage, but also social power and prestige. 9 That professional groups have exploited their position for such ends can hardly be denied. 10 At the same time, where there is a need for a system of allocation of offices, there are clearly good reasons why those who possess relevant expertise should play a central role in that system.
On the account given here, then, the relation of the individual professional to the end definitive of their role is mediated through an institutional framework that both facilitates, but, importantly, constrains, their practice. They may, thus, be required to act in ways that do not directly contribute to the realisation of the defining end, as when they contribute to professional education, participate in professional bodies and so on. They may even be required to act in ways that conflict with the realisation of that end, as when, for example, a nurse refrains from undertaking a medical procedure that he is competent to do and that would help a patient, because he is not licensed to do so. The rationale for such requirements, of course, is that overall the end of the profession is best served by general conformity to institutional rules, even if in particular cases it may not be.
Professional ethics for politicians?
Can politicians be regarded as (like) professionals? There are some striking similarities, at least, between the two groups. Though they both have venerable historical provenance, the institutional structures that define their roles have developed relatively recently, and are still in flux. The professions emerged in recognisable form no earlier than the mid-nineteenth century. 11 Similarly, it is only in the past century or so that the political role has taken on the form it now has in liberal democracies, as a paid occupation, whose members typically belong to well-disciplined party groupings, and are elected by popular suffrage. Like professionals, politicians act to provide fundamental goods, occupy well-paid and prestigious positions and do interesting and creative work, and indeed are increasingly drawn from the ranks of professions.
There is an obvious difficulty in trying to describe a role morality for politicians that does not typically apply to the attempt to do the same for professionals. Roles, as claimed above, are distinguished both by the specific ends they aim to achieve, and the means used to achieve them, and consequently role morality describes what is conducive to (or hinders) the realisation of the various ends. For most professions, the ends that define them are, at least in broad terms, clear enough. In the case of politics, on the other hand, there is wide and radical disagreement about both the ends of politics, and hence of politicians, and about the means that should be used to achieve those ends. Socialists, for example, will see the powers that legitimately belong to the political office very differently from market libertarians; even among democrats there is disagreement about the proper function of elected politicians.
Despite these disagreements, I take it that there is at least fairly general consensus that in the modern world there is a need for (a system of) properly functioning states, which provide for the conditions necessary for the security and well-being of their inhabitants. Politicians should, at least, act in ways that help bring about and maintain that system. This requirement is, then, foundational to the role morality that applies to politicians.
There are two related senses to the term 'state', in its modern usage. Firstly, it can refer to a unified geographical region, within which a single sovereign power has the ability to determine how violence is to be used; a monopoly that is often taken to be definitive of the state. (A 'failed state', then, is a geographical area in which there is no effective monopoly control over violence.) Secondly, the term 'state' refers to the corporate entity that exercises political authority within that region; an entity consisting of a Writing at the time of the emergence of the modern state, Machiavelli provides significant accounts both of the nature of the political role and of the rationale for political office. The prince instructs would-be rulers how to gain and retain power over 'principalities', which are clearly states in the first of the senses noted above. But they are not understood as states in the second of those senses. The principality is, in effect, the personal estate of the prince, albeit one he is only likely to retain with the acceptance of the people. As Quentin Skinner notes: in all the discussions about the state and the government of princes in the first half of the sixteenth century, there will be found scarcely any instance in which the etat, staat or state in question is unequivocally separated from the status or standing of the prince himself. 12 The flourishing of this estate is the defining purpose of the prince, and the virtues of the prince are those qualities that conduce to such flourishing. The ability of the prince to persuade the people of his possession of these qualities -of his 'majesty' -is an important element in gaining popular support. The demonstrated capacity and willingness to use violence effectively is essential to the effectiveness of the prince. Within the state, the ability to enforce law, raise taxes, and so on, ultimately depends on being able to make credible threats to exert irresistible coercive force. And the prince must be able to deter and resist potential usurpers, both from within and without.
The capacity to use violence effectively is not a princely virtue merely because of its direct effects, however. 'Majesty' is at least in part something that exists in the eye of the beholder. As Machiavelli tells the prince:
Men in general judge by their eyes rather than by their hands; because everyone is in a position to watch, few are in a position to come in close touch with you. 13 Everyone sees what you appear to be, few experience what you really are. 14 Machiavelli sees various implications arising for the prince from this distance that most of his subjects have from his motives. Notoriously, he sees it as licensing or even demanding that the prince use immoral methods such as deception, where this is likely to lead to outcomes that benefit him, while publicly professing the highest moral standards. More generally, it means that the appearance of majesty is in fact one of the component elements of majesty. The virtuous prince is, then, a kind of virtuososomeone who not only has highly developed skills but impresses others through their display. There are few ways of impressing the public more effectively than the bold use of violent force.
The monopolisation of coercive force across a territory is a precondition for the existence of legal and commercial institutions within it. 15 Any society that is dependent on such institutions, then, relies on such a monopoly being held. At the same time, the monopolisation of force presents clear dangers to the members of such societies. Even though it is in the interests of the prince that his subjects as a group thrive, and that the
rule of law be generally respected, it is a purely contingent matter whether it is better for him to promote, or damage, the good of particular individuals or groups. And given the benefits that flow to the holder of a monopoly of coercive force in a state, there is a standing temptation to those who have, or believe they have, skills in the use of violence, to overthrow the current holder and make themselves prince -and in doing so demonstrate their greater fitness for the position.
A system of princely states, then, is bound to be riven by war and sedition -exactly the picture of early modern Italy we find in the pages of The prince. In his Discourses 16 Machiavelli suggests that political stability can be achieved through the erection of well-formed republican institutions. In effect, he argues that political roles should be subsumed into political offices, in order to create a state qua corporate entity. This transformation applies to the rulers but also, importantly, to the citizens. The prince attains and retains his status through a personal relationship with the citizens of his state. When enough of them stop seeing him as the legitimate ruler, his reign is doomed. The subjective attitudes of the citizens, then, are constitutive of political authority. The erection of political institutions means that the relationship between governor and governed is no longer personal. Just as the ruler in the corporate state takes on an office that constrains their actions, so does the citizen. The citizen is bound, for example, to accept the authority of the person(s) who occupies the ruler's office, even where they judge that there are others who are better fitted to occupy it, and are permitted only to act in specified ways to attempt to change the identity of that person.
The two major political offices of the corporate state, then, are those of politician/ruler on the one hand, and of citizen on the other. The citizens of a state are the relevant public to whom the goods that the politician aims to provide should be made available. The professional ethics of politicians (or perhaps more accurately the ethics of professional politicians) clearly must deal with issues of personal corruption, given the opportunities political life presents for such behaviour and the potential harm it can cause. But the focus of such an ethics should be on the structure of the institutional framework within which their office fits, and their relation to that structure.
In the previous section of this paper I pointed to three (non-exclusive reasons) for making a role into an office: the need to limit the number of (would-be) practitioners; the need to be able to deter role holders from abusing their skills by the threat of expulsion from office if they do so; and the guarantee of expertise given by certification. All these reasons apply to the political role. The need to limit the number of would-be practitioners of the political art follows as a matter of logic as soon as the desirability of monopolisation of coercive power is accepted. And the potential for abuse of such monopolisation is obvious, as discussed above. The third condition, regarding certification, is more complex, and more contentious.
Machiavelli's prince is, as it were, self-certifying: the fact that he has achieved and maintained political power demonstrates his possession of the relevant practical skills. The person who gains political power by coming to hold an office, however, is not selfcertifying in this way. There are obvious reasons to want assurances that political offices will only go to those who possess the skills and attitudes necessary to occupy them effectively. At the same time, there are also good reasons not to allow those who already hold such offices -even though, presumably, they possess the relevant expertise -to determine who that should be. In the case of the professions, the possibility of state One thing that obviously distinguishes politicians (at least in representative democracies) from paradigmatic professionals is that politicians gain their paid position through popular election. Thus they do not have to possess proof of expertise, such as educational qualifications or prior relevant experience. On the other hand, at least in countries such as Australia, the US and the UK, where a candidate is highly unlikely to be elected unless endorsed by a party, members of parties have a good deal of de facto control over who has the opportunity to gain election, and over the distribution of offices to those who are elected. Parties have become an integral part of the political system in modern representative democracies, and they exercise many of the functions carried out by professional bodies, filtering potential candidates for political office and providing discipline and support for those who succeed.
Ultimately, however, in such systems it is the people who decide who gains and retains political office. One justification of universal suffrage in a liberal democracy, then, is that it puts control of the appointment of political officials in the hands of those who have interests in ensuring that those officials are competent and non-corrupt. Even where they have such interests, however, problems of motivation and expertise remain. 17 Why should voters care about informing themselves -and how can they find out what they need to know? Again, these are difficulties that lend themselves to solution, or at least amelioration, through institutional design. In a system of adversarial politics, politicians have incentives to present and publicise evidence of their achievements and of their opponents' failings in areas that concern their electors.
18 Thus the need for strong systems of public accountability for politicians, and those they control, and for effective ways of detecting and sanctioning breaches of that system. Even with the best designed political systems, politicians must be granted areas of discretionary power. While the legislative function may be constrained up to a point by, for example, constitutional restrictions, politicians must be granted a good deal of discretion to make laws that respond to changing contingencies. The need for discretionary power is even stronger in the case of politicians in positions of supreme authority, who must have the power to act expeditiously in times of war and other national emergencies. The temptation to abuse such power is particularly strong in a representative democracy. Machiavelli's observation about the distance between the motivations of their rulers and their perception is relevant here. Political leaders can, for example, often tap into or mobilise popular emotions, and present themselves as strong, courageous and bold by taking or threatening military action, even when doing so is not in the long-term national interest.
To resist these sorts of temptations, and to understand the ways in which they should act to support and strengthen, requires a degree of what might be called moral selfconsciousness on the part of professional politicians. That is, they must be able to stand aside from their narrowly partisan goals, and reflect on the rationale for the political institutions within which they operate.
Conclusion
In the first section of this paper I specified the conditions that must hold for someone to be facing a DHS -a situation where there are powerful consequentialist reasons for them to take an action which, according to the moral rules that are basic to ordinary morality, they ought not to do. I also claimed that holders of certain kinds of morally justified roles are particularly likely to find themselves facing dirty hands situations: they have accepted the responsibility for acting in ways that conduce to realising the defining end of the role, and possess skills, expertise and so on to take actions that will so conduce, even where those actions are normally morally wrong.
On this account of the way in which the demands of a role can generate DHS, the consequences that the role holder ought to consider are those that are relevant to achieving the defining ends of their role. Justifying an action that normally would be considered wrong by appeal to the requirement to be prepared to get one's hands dirty in the course of discharging the duties of that role, then, presupposes an understanding of the nature of the role itself. In the second and third sections of this paper I have sketched an outline of the role of 'professional politicians' which suggests that this role be seen as an office within the corporate state (and more broadly within a society of such states). While there is a good deal of openness in the goals that politicians can legitimately set out to achieve, those goals, and the means that they use to achieve them, must be at least compatible with the continued existence of the institutional structure that is the condition for the very existence of the role of the professional politician. This might in fact mean that, on occasion, professional politicians ought not to act in ways that are likely to lead to the realisation of the moral goals that motivated their political involvement in the first place.
Consider, for example, Walzer's morally motivated candidate for election who 'in order to win ... must make a deal with a dishonest ward boss, involving the granting of contracts for school construction over the next four years'. 19 Walzer thinks that this person should be prepared to make such a deal, since 'his decision to run was a commitment ... to do within rational limits whatever is necessary to win'. 20 The question is, what are the 'rational limits' here. Since willingness to make such a deal must be contrary to any sane system of role morality for professional politicians (it clearly could not be universalised, for example, or publicly professed), the deal cannot be justified by appeal to the demands of that morality.
In the first section of this paper I suggested that for Walzer the demand that political actors be prepared to get their hands dirty is a requirement of good faith. The only justification for an individual becoming involved in the murky world of politics is to bring about a morally good outcome. Since achieving that outcome will often only be possible by committing a moral wrong, the political actor should be prepared to commit that wrong -to get their hands dirty -when it helps achieve their end. I think that the way that Walzer presents the choice facing professional politicians, at least, is misleading. Since the state (and the system of states) is a human contrivance then its justification (if it has one) is, broadly, consequentialist. But it does not follow that the reasoning appropriate to persons whose role it is to direct the affairs of that state should be directly consequentialist. In fact, as implied above, their reasoning in many cases ought to be constrained by the obligations of their office, even if that leads to a less than optimal outcome by the lights of their ultimate moral aim. This is not, in my opinion, 18 Recent advances in electronic communication have vastly increased the ease of two-way communication between politicians and individual voters, and hence the potential influence of voters. For a discussion of these advances and some relevant ethical issues raised by the ways they are being used, see Peter van Onselen, 'Private information and public accountability: political parties' constituent databases', Australian Journal of Professional and Applied Ethics, 5(1), 2003, pp 1-13. 19 Walzer, op cit, p 67. 20 Ibid.
